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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-4195 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANSELMO JESUS RIVERA, 
                                                Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 5-10-cr-00632-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Gene E.K. Pratter 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 23, 2013 
 
Before:   SLOVITER, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 26, 2013) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Anselmo Jesus Rivera appeals the judgment of conviction entered against him by 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for possession of 
cocaine base (“crack”) with intent to distribute and for possession of a firearm by a felon.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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I. Background 
In September 2008, members of the Drug Enforcement Task Force of Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania began investigating suspected drug trafficking at 613 N. Plum 
Street in Lancaster.  Task force detectives surveilling that address saw a high level of foot 
traffic to and from a first floor apartment identified as “Apartment A,” and they watched 
Rivera enter and leave the apartment on many occasions.  Under the direction of one of 
the detectives, a confidential informant made two controlled purchases of cocaine from 
Rivera at Apartment A in September and October 2008.        
On October 17, 2008, the task force detectives obtained a state search warrant for 
Apartment A.  To get the warrant, a detective submitted an affidavit stating that both the 
confidential informant who had completed the controlled drug purchases and a second 
informant had said that a man identified as Rivera was selling cocaine from the 
apartment.  The detectives executed the warrant that evening.  Shortly after 8:00 p.m., 
they saw Rivera enter the apartment, and they then went to the apartment door and 
knocked.  They heard someone inside approach the door but then, without opening it, run 
to the rear of the apartment.  A detective pounded on the door and announced that they 
were police executing a search warrant.  When there was no response, the detectives used 
a key they had obtained from the landlord to enter the apartment.  As they approached the 
rear of the apartment, Rivera darted out of a bathroom.  A detective told him to get down 
on the ground and, when Rivera did not comply, the detective took him into custody.  
The detectives then entered the bathroom and recovered two bags of what appeared to be 
crack (one of which had been thrown in the toilet), digital gram scales (one of which was 
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switched on), and plastic sandwich bags.  They searched the rest of the apartment and 
recovered a plastic bag later found to contain 157 grams of crack, a loaded 9mm Taurus 
handgun and a loaded magazine, additional scales and drug packaging supplies, and a 
police scanner.   
On September 28, 2010, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging 
Rivera with one count of possession of 50 or more grams of crack with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 1); one count of possession of 50 
or more grams of crack with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school,
1
 in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860 (Count 2); one count of possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 3);  and 
one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) (Count 4). 
Before trial, Rivera filed motions seeking (1) to test, via a Franks hearing,
2
 the 
veracity of the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant, (2) to suppress physical 
evidence and statements, and (3) to compel disclosure of the identities of confidential 
informants whose information was used to obtain the search warrant.  The District Court 
denied his motions for a Franks hearing and for disclosure of the identities of the 
                                              
1
 The property at 613 N. Plum Street is 320 feet from a secondary school operated 
by the Lancaster School District.   
2
 The Fourth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to an evidentiary hearing 
when he “makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement ... was included 
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to 
the finding of probable cause ... .”  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 
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confidential informants, and, after an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, 
denied that motion as well.   
Rivera‟s trial began on July 5, 2011, with consideration of Count 4 bifurcated 
from the trial on the other counts.  Ultimately, he was convicted on all counts.  The 
District Court sentenced him to 186 months‟ imprisonment, followed by 8 years‟ 
supervised release, a $1,500 fine, and a $300 special assessment.  Judgment was entered 
on November 17, 2001, and Rivera filed a notice of appeal that same day.
3
  
II. Discussion4 
Rivera raises four arguments before us.  First, he claims that the District Court 
erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence that the task force detectives 
                                              
3
 We appointed counsel to represent Rivera in this appeal, but that counsel filed a 
motion to withdraw on the ground that Rivera wished to proceed pro se.  Rivera filed a 
waiver of counsel, and we granted counsel‟s motion to withdraw.  Rivera subsequently 
filed a pro se brief. 
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court‟s denial of a motion 
to suppress “for clear error as to the underlying factual findings,” and we “exercise[] 
plenary review of [the court‟s] application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. 
Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).  We review a district court‟s denial of a request 
for a Franks hearing for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a district court‟s determination as to whether a criminal 
defendant has made a “Franks showing” is “reversible for abuse of discretion”).  
Likewise, “[w]e review the district court‟s decision not to order disclosure of an 
informant‟s identity for abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 679.  Lastly, “[w]e apply a 
particularly deferential standard of review to challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting conviction.” United States v. Powell, 693 F.3d 398, 401 n.6 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “We view all evidence in the light most favorable to 
the government, and sustain conviction as long as any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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found when they executed the search warrant.  Second, he says that the Court abused its 
discretion when it denied his request for a Franks hearing.  Third, he argues that the 
Court abused its discretion when it denied his request for the disclosure of the identities 
of the confidential informants who provided information that was the basis of the search 
warrant.  Fourth and finally, he asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to support his 
conviction.  Each argument is wanting.
5
 
A. Motion to Suppress 
Rivera first argues that the District Court should have suppressed evidence found 
during the execution of the search warrant.  He contends that “[t]he search warrant 
affidavit in this case was based largely on the uncorroborated information of an untested, 
unreliable confidential informant.”  (Supplemental App. at 376.)   
The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant be supported by probable 
cause, and “[e]vidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that is not so supported may 
be suppressed.”  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 525 (3d Cir. 2010).   The 
applicable standards for issuing and reviewing a search warrant were set forth in Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
                                              
5
 Rivera also argues for the first time in this appeal that one of the detectives 
testified falsely before the grand jury, and that the indictment was therefore defective.  
That claim was not raised in a pretrial motion, and is therefore waived.  See Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 12(b)(3)(B) (requiring that a motion alleging a defect in the indictment be made by 
motion before trial).  Cf. United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a claim that the institution of prosecution was defective not raised in a pretrial 
motion is waived).  In addition, Rivera suggests that he suffered from ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  We ordinarily do not review ineffective assistance claims on direct 
appeal, but instead defer the issue until collateral review, if that is sought.  United States 
v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003).  We therefore, at present, decline to 
consider Rivera‟s ineffective assistance claim. 
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practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place.”  Id. at 238.  “[T]he duty of a reviewing court is 
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis ... for conclud[ing] that 
probable cause existed.”  Id. at 238-39 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “To determine this, a court must consider the „totality of the circumstances,‟ 
and need not conclude that it was „more likely than not‟ that the evidence sought was at 
the place described.”  United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted), rev’d on other grounds by Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).  
“[D]irect evidence linking the place to be searched to the crime is not required for the 
issuance of a search warrant.”  United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
The search warrant in this case was amply supported by probable cause.  As set 
forth in the affidavit, both confidential informants stated that they had purchased cocaine 
from Rivera at the apartment, and the two controlled buys from Rivera completed under 
the supervision of the task force provided additional corroboration.  See United States v. 
Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 556 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding probable cause when informant‟s tip 
was corroborated by his subsequent controlled buy).  Also, the detectives had conducted 
extensive surveillance of Apartment A and had observed comings and goings consistent 
with a location where drugs were being sold.  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13 (noting 
that “seemingly innocent activity [might] bec[o]me suspicious in the light of the initial 
tip” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Lastly, the detectives had observed Rivera often 
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entering and exiting the premises, and they had previously verified that he had a history 
of trafficking in cocaine.  Therefore, Rivera‟s contention that the search warrant was not 
properly supported by probable cause is without merit, and there was no error in the 
District Court‟s decision to deny the suppression motion.  
B.  Denial of Request for a Franks Hearing 
Rivera next argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his 
request for a Franks hearing.  In seeking that hearing, Rivera claimed that the detective 
who provided the search warrant affidavit “should have entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth” of the information provided by the confidential informants (Supplemental App. 
at 389), and that the detective would “not be able to produce the informants who are 
alleged to have provided the information,” (id. at 390).    
In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
requires an evidentiary hearing to be held at the defendant‟s request when a “defendant 
makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement ... was included by the 
affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the 
finding of probable cause... .”  438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).  “It is well-established that a 
substantial showing of the informant’s untruthfulness is not sufficient to warrant a Franks 
hearing.”  United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 1993).  “[A] substantial 
preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsity on the part of the affiant must be 
made in order for the defendant to have a right to an evidentiary hearing on the affiant‟s 
veracity.”  Id.  To make the preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing, the 
defendant must show intentional or reckless falsity on the part of the affiant, id., and 
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“cannot rest on mere conclusory allegations ... but rather must present an offer of proof 
contradicting the affidavit, including materials such as sworn affidavits or otherwise 
reliable statements of witnesses,” United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
Rivera has failed to make such a showing.  As with his motion to suppress, he 
simply questions the veracity of the information provided by the confidential informants, 
and he offers only conclusory allegations as to what the affiant should have believed 
based on that information.  Even if the information provided by the informants was 
unreliable, Rivera has offered no evidence that the detective who provided the affidavit 
either knew that the information was not true or recklessly disregarded its falsity.  See 
Brown, 3 F.3d at 677 (noting that “it [is] not enough to show simply that the informant 
may have lied”); United States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming 
denial of a Franks hearing where proof offered reflected only on veracity of informant 
and not on veracity of affiant).  Rivera was therefore not entitled to a Franks hearing, and 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying him one. 
C.  Denial of Request to Disclose Confidential Informants 
Rivera next argues that the District Court erred when it refused to order the 
disclosure of the identities of the two confidential informants.  He basically repeats, as he 
argued in the District Court, that “information concerning the confidential informants‟ 
identities[,] ... sources of information[,] and motives behind their cooperation with law 
enforcement authorities [was] needed in order to mount a sufficient defense in this case.”  
(Supplemental App. at 408.) 
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“What is usually referred to as the informer‟s privilege is in reality the 
Government‟s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish 
information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.”  
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).  “The scope of the privilege is limited 
by its underlying purpose,” id. at 60, which is “the furtherance and protection of the 
public interest in effective law enforcement,” id. at 59.  The Government may be required 
to disclose an informant‟s identity when “(1) the [informant‟s] possible testimony was 
highly relevant; (2) it might have disclosed an entrapment; (3) it might have thrown doubt 
upon the defendant‟s identity; and (4) the informer was the sole participant other than the 
accused, in the transaction charged.”  United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 198-99 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1967); Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 
63-65).  But “[w]here an informant‟s role was in validating a search, disclosure of his 
identity is not required.”  United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) (en 
banc) (citing McCray, 386 U.S. at 304).   
In this case, the Government was not required to disclose the identities of the two 
confidential informants.  Rivera has not shown that the informants‟ testimony was needed 
for any of the purposes that we recognized in Jiles.  He simply asserts that it was needed 
for his defense and speculates that the informant who completed the controlled buys 
would admit that the seller had not been Rivera.  “[M]ere speculation as to the usefulness 
of the informant‟s testimony to the defendant is insufficient to justify disclosure of his 
identity.”  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the 
record suggests that the informants‟ roles were limited to validating the search, which is 
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not a sufficient purpose to compel disclosure of their identity, id., the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion when it declined to compel the disclosure.   
D.  Sufficiency of the Evidence  
Finally, Rivera contends that the evidence was not sufficient for a jury to convict 
him of possession of either the crack or the gun seized from the apartment.  He argues 
that he was convicted based on his “mere presence” and that there was “no physical 
evidence on the gun[,] no fingerprints, nothing linking [him] to the drugs or guns.”  
(Appellant‟s Br. at 4.) 
“[A] claim of insufficiency of the evidence places a very heavy burden on an 
appellant.”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, “we examine the totality 
of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and interpret the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government as the verdict winner.”  United States v. Pavulak, 700 
F.3d 651, 668 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “If all the pieces of 
evidence, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find [the defendant] 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then we must uphold the jury‟s verdict.”  Id. (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
The Government is not required to prove actual possession for purposes of §§ 
922(g) and 924(c), but may instead prove “constructive possession.”  See Brown, 3 F.3d 
at 680 (government entitled to prove constructive possession rather than actual 
possession of drugs found in defendant‟s home).  “Constructive possession exists if an 
individual knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise 
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dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons.”  
United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “The kind of evidence that can establish dominion and control includes ... 
evidence that the defendant attempted to hide or to destroy the contraband ... .”  United 
States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1996).  For purposes of  § 924(c), however, 
“the mere presence of a gun is not enough.  What is instead required is evidence more 
specific to the particular defendant, showing that his or her possession actually furthered 
the drug trafficking offense.”  United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  In making that determination, factors that are relevant include 
“the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of 
the weapon, ... whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time 
and circumstances under which the gun is found.”  Id. (quoting Ceballos-Torres, 218 
F.3d at 414-15) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Drawing all inferences in favor of the government, the evidence at trial was 
certainly sufficient to support the jury‟s verdict that Rivera was in possession of both the 
crack and the gun, and that possession of the gun was in furtherance of his drug 
trafficking activities.  That evidence included the fact that, immediately after Rivera 
hastily exited the bathroom, the detectives found in it two bags of crack, one of which 
had been thrown in the toilet, and that they found a large bag of crack hidden in a 
clothing bin underneath a shirt that was identified as belonging to Rivera.  The logical 
inference from those facts was that Rivera had attempted to hide or dispose of the drugs, 
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suggesting possession.  In addition, the gun was a loaded semi-automatic weapon found 
in the apartment together with a large quantity of drugs and drug processing supplies.  
That, together with the large amount of cash found on Rivera‟s person, suggests that the 
gun was used to protect both the drugs and cash proceeds from sales.  The fact that the 
gun itself was not on Rivera‟s person is not dispositive.  See Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853 
(finding that a firearm concealed under floor tiles was accessible, and noting that 
“immediate accessibility at the time of search or arrest is not a legal requirement for a § 
924(c) conviction”).  Based on all of the evidence, we cannot say that no reasonable jury 
could have returned a judgment of conviction, and we will not disturb the jury‟s verdict. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
